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[Crim. No. 5035. In Bank. Jan. 26. 1950.1 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EDWARD ALBERT 
HUIZENGA, Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Instructions-Circumstantial r.vidence.-In a 
criminal case based ')n circumstantial evidence, a defendant is 
amply protected by instructions that crime may be proven by 
circumstantial evidence, but the facts and circumsta nCl:ls ;n 
evidence must be consistent with each other and with defenu 
ant's guilt, :..lust be inconsistent with any reasonable theory 
of his innocence, and must show his gUllt beyond a reasonllble 
doubt; that if the evidence is susceptible of twa interpretll tlOns, 
each of which appears to be reasonable, one pOlDtiug to dE-fellu, 
ant's guilt and the othl'r to !lis innocence, it is the j\4I'Y's duty 
to adopt tha' interpretation which will .Hlmit of det'l'ndant'd 
innocence and to reject that which points to bls guilt; and 
that if one of the possible conclusions ::Ihould appear to be 
reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be tbe 
jury's duty to adhere to the reasonable dedu('tion and to r"jl'ct 
the unreasonable. 
[2] Id.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Where i:vidence is 
Circumstantial.-It is not the function of 8 reviewing court to 
determine whether the circumstances relied on to justify a 
verdict of conviction might be reasonably reconcile~ with Ihe 
innocence of defendant. The court must assume in favor I)f : 
the verdict the existence of every f8('t that the Jury could 1'1'8-
sonably determine from the evillenc\: and then .letl'r1l1illl' 
whether or not a reasonable jury could find defcndunt guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[1] See 8 Cal.Jur. 371; 53 4m.Jur. 574. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminul Law, ~ tS~H; ~<!l Cl'lUJlDlll 
Law, § 1327; [3) Homicide § 145(1). 
) 
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[3] Homicide-Evidence-Jircnmstantial Evidence.-A convicti 
of tint degree murder was supported by circumr.tantial evidene 
from which the jury could reasonably be convincp.d beyond , .. 
reasonable doubt that defendant killed decedent to obtai 
pos'lession of his belo::lgings and money, where it appeared that 
defendant, who occupied decedent's cabin, assumed ownership.' 
of decedent's goods immediately aftel' his disappearance; o.e-=1.' 
fendant Jug the latrine in which decedent's bloody belongings~ 
were found, sold decedent's :;oods, and lied when QUestioned1::. about it; the headboard of the bunk which decedent had used,; 
and blankets found on the bunk, were stained with human 
blood; the rope found in the cabin 'Vas the same type as that,,1 
used to tie the ankles of decedent's body; the ",lade of a small :i 
hatchet found in the cabin fitted the wounds ('n decedent's': 
neck "almost perfectly": and a bottle containing the sum:; 
that defendant specified as the amount stolen from decedent ~ 
was found buried in the floor' of the shack. . :1 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Oode, §1239{1 
from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of Sacramento Oounty .\ 
and from an order denying a new trial. Raymond T. Ooughlin, I 
Judge. Affirmed.. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
death penalty, affirmed. 
Elvin F. Sheehy. Public Defender, and Clarence H. Pease 
for Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J .-Edward Albert Huizenga was convicted 
by a jury of first degree murder and has been sentenced to 
death. On this appeal from the judgment under Penal 
Code. section 1239 (b)' the sole issue is whether the evidence 
is sufficient to justify the conviction. 
On January 18, 1949, the body of a male person was taken 
from the American River east of the Jibboom Street bridge 
in Sacramento Oounty. The body was headless, clothed 
only in a suit of underwear, with the legs tied together at the 
ankles with a piece of sash cord. Fingerprint records estab-
lished the identity of the body as that of Arthur Paulson. On 
January 24th, the decapitated head was found, and the iden-
tity of the body confirmed. The county autopsy surgeon, 
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the right side of the head there were multiple small fractures 
of the bones radiating in several directions. One piece of the 
temporal bone abont an inch long had been driven into the 
brain, presumably by a dull object. Dr. Wallace tt'stifit'd 
that death had been caused by laceration of the brain, subdural 
hemorrhage, and the multiple fractures of the skull. 
On January 20th, defendant was found living in a tarpaper 
shack that had been owned and occupied by the decedent. 
Defendant stated, in answer to questions before trial and 
while testifying on his own behalf, that he had known Arthul 
Paulson since September, 1948. when they met while picking 
tomatoes. They camped together east of the Jibboom Street 
bridge until about the first of November. At that time. they 
separated and went to different parts of the state where 
harvesting was in progress. Defendant said that he returned 
to Sacramento County about December 15th. He pitched camp 
in the same area that Paulson and he had occupied during 
September. The morning of December 17th, defend.ant met 
Paulson, who invited him to move to the shack that Paulson 
had constructed from tarpaper and wooden poles. Defendant 
did not stay with Paulson that night but moved in with him 
the following day. December 18th. Paulson slept on a bunk, 
and defendant slept on boxing board laid on the dirt noor. 
Defendant testified that Paulson went into Sacramento 
on December 21st to obtain a lamp for his shack This testi-
mony was corroborated by the witness Doucet, 8 neighbor 
in the camp area, who met Paulson in Sacramento about noon. 
Paulson was on his way back to the cabin with the lamp. He 
was in good humor and did not speak of leaving the vicinity. 
There is no evidence that he was seen alive thereafter except 
by defendant. 
Defendant testified further that when he returned to the 
shac1,. early in the afternoon, after trying unsuccessfuly to 
find work, Paulson was already there cooking. He looked 
upset and acted queerly. When defendant inquired what was 
wrong, Paulson told him that "on the way home he had been 
strong-armed and robbed of $50.00. " Paulson told defendant 
that he would not be in Sacramento the next day, that he was 
going to Ventura for work. That night defendant and 
Paulson read the newspapers and retired around 8 or 9 o'clock. 
Early the following morning, December 22d, defendant 
awoke when Paulson was building a fire. Paulson made up 
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cooldng utensils and tied the roll with sash cord. Defendant 
asked Paulson if he was going to store his property. Paulson 
said he was going to take what he wanted and told defendant: 
"You can have what I leave." Paulson had certain items of 
property belonging to one William Allen that he told defend-
ant to leave with Doucet if defendant left before Allen re-
turned. 
Later in the day defendant saw Doucet and told him that 
Paulson had been strong-armed the prr.vious afternoon and 
that $50 had been taken from him. Defendant told Doucet 
that Paulson had gone to Ventura and that he took his bedroll 
and his clock, leaving everything else for defendant. Doucet 
visited defendant at the shack around 11 o'clock that morning. 
He observed that a suit of Paulson's underwear was on the 
line and that defendant was slicing bacon that had belonged 
to Paulson. Defendant said that Paulson had left all his 
food for defendant. Doucet observed defendant later con-
structing a latrine near Paulson's shack about 100 feet from 
Doucet's. 
On the same day defendant visited the cabin of Eugene 
Belanger in the same area. He had not previously spoken 
to Belanger .He told him substantially what he had told 
Doucet concerning Paulson's being robbed, becoming dis-
gusted, and going to Ventura. The following day, defendant 
passed Belanger's camp with a rifle and a gunny sack and told 
Belanger that he was going hunting. Belanger thought this 
odd because the day was foggy and "you couldn't see fifteen 
feet ahead of you." Belanger testified, however, that the fog 
lifted around noon. 
Doucet testified that two or three days after Decembe·r 22, 
he observed defendant taking some of Paulson's clothes and 
a suitcase out of the camp area. Defendant told Doucet 
that he was going to put them in storage. The records of 
Bill's Second-Hand Store in Sacramento, however show, and 
defendant admits, that on December 23d he sold certain 
articles belonging to Paulson. Defendant used the assumed 
name, James Owens, and gave the address 1515 Fourth St., 
Sacramento, where he had previously resided. On December 
29th, he sold a shirt of his own to the same store under the 
same assumed name. 
On or about December 24th, Doucet observed defendant 
burning straw that he had taken from the bunk in the cabin. 
He replied to Doucet's questioning that he was burning it 
because the mice had been making nests in it. Defendant 
) 
Jan. 1950] PEOPLE V. HUIZENGA 
(34 C.2d 869; 213 P.2d 710J 
673 
replaced the straw with three sofa cushions that be bad pur-
chased after Paulson's disappearance. 
Early in January, 1949, Earl King and two others con· 
structed a cabin in the Jibboom Street jungle area about 
100 feet from the one occupied by defendant. While they 
were building, defendant went to them and told them that 
the land was "private property or leased property." King 
replied that he had as much right there as anyone else. De-
fendant said then, "Well, if you are going to build down 
here, be sure and use my latrine," and from then on, King 
and his companions did so. On January 18t)1, King discovered 
the headless body, later identified by fingerprints as that of 
Paulson, floating in the American River near the camp area. 
On January 20th, three deputy sheriffs went to Paulson '. 
shack, then occupied by defendant. When they questioned 
him about Paulson, defendant explained Paulson's departure 
as' he had previously to Doucet and Belanger. The officers 
found a small caliber rifle, a small hatchet, and some sash 
cord rope in the shack. 
On January 21st, the deputy sheriffs returned to the jungle 
area to search for the head of the body. Their attention was 
directed to the latrine that defendant had constructed on the 
day that, according to his testimony, Paulson had left for 
V cntura. After digging into the latrine about 2 feet, they 
discovered a folded pair of dark trousers; a foot lower they 
discovered a large bundle of clothing in an olive green 
tarpaulin. The bundle included a large green blanket, 
sleeping bag, dark coat, red checkered shirt, glove, and a 
large blanket. These were identified by William Allen as the 
property of or similar to the property of Paulson. 
The officers also removed two sheet blankets from the bunk 
in the cabin, and pieces of wood from the bottom and head-
board of the bunk, which were marked with a reddish stain. 
A clinical laboratory technologist, Roy B. Johnson, Jr., 
testified that the stains on the tarpaulin, the coat, and plaid 
shirt taken from the latrine, and the two blankets from the 
bunk, were human blood. Johnson found blood on the sleeping 
bag and blanket taken from the latrine but was unable to 
determine whether it was human blood. David Q. Burd, a 
criminologist of the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation, 
testified that the small hatchet found in the shack on January 
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owned by Paulson, and a hammer left with Paulson by AII(>n 
had blood of unknown origin on them. He testified that tIl,' 
block of wood taken from the headboard of the bunk hlld 
human blood on it. Dr. Wallace, the autopsy surgeon, t(>sti· 
tied that the blade of the small hatchet titted "almost Iwr-
fectly" the wounds on Paulson's neck. He testified also 
that the hammer part of the hatchet could have been used to 
cause the fractures of the skull. 
At the time defendant was questioned on January 21, 1949. 
he was asked to tie a knot in the sash cord found in the 
decedent's cabin. The knot that he tied was similar to the 
knot in the rope around the ankles of the decedent's body. ! 
Defendant was first tried in April, 1949, but the jury was . 
unable to agree upon a verdict. Thereafter on April 22d 
Deputy Sheriff Chapman returned to the site of the Paulson 
shack, which had been torn down, to make a further investiga-
tion on his own initiative. He dug into what had been the ! 
dirt floor of the cabin and found buried there a small bottle ' 
containing $50 in currency. The next day Chapman returned 
with two other deputies. After more digging they uncovered 
four small pieces of newspaper that were identified as parts 
of the Sacramento Union dated January 17, 1949. Deputy 
Sheriff Munizich testified that the newspaper came from the 
hole in which the bottle was found. Counsel for defendant 
vigorously attacked the testimony given by Deputy Sheriffs 
Chapman, Munizich, and Mason concerning their visit after 
the first trial to the site of Paulson's shack. He said, ., We 
contend that this case and the evidence produced herein' is the 
result of planted evidence." There is no evidence in the rec-
ord to support this contention. 
In statements to the officers and in his testimony, defendant 
consistently adhered to his original account of Paulson's de-
parture and the reasons therefor. His statements and testi-
mony varied as to the articles Paulson took from the shack, 
and he admitted that he lied to Doucet about Paulson's taking 
several articles that in fact he did not take. He offered the 
explanation that Doucet was in the habit of "cleaning up" 
after the former occupants had gone. Defendant at first denied 
the sale of Paulson's articles to the secondhand store, but 
after his handwriting had been compared with his signature 
in the sale book, he admitted making the sale. He admitted 
working on the latrine the day Paulson left and asking others 
to use it, but he denied placing Paulson's property in it. 
He has always denied that he killed Paulson. 
/ 
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[1] The trial court instructed the jury that "Crime m8~' 
be proven by circumstantial evidence as wel1 as by rlirt>et 
evidence of an eye witness, but the facts and circumb1anees 
in evidence must be consistent with each other and with the 
guilt of the defendant, and inconsistent with any reasonable 
theory of his innocence, and must show his guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 
"If the evidence in this case is susceptible of two eonstrue-
tions or interpretations, each of which appears to you to be rea-
sonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant, 
and the other to his innocence, it is your duly, nuder the law, 
to adopt that interpretation which will admit of the defend-
ant's innocence, and reject that which points to his guilt. 
"You will notice that this rule applies only when both of 
the two possible opposing eonclusions appear to you to be 
reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible con-
clusions should appear to you to be reasonable and the other 
to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to the 
reasonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, bearing 
in mind, however, that even if the reasonable deduction points 
to defendant's guilt, the entire proof must carry the eonvincing 
force required by law to support a verdict of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
These instructions afford ample protection to a defendant 
in a case based on circumstantial evidence. (St>e People v. 
Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 174 [163 P.2d 8]; P~oplt v. Green, 
13 Cal.2d 37,44 [87 P.2d 8211.) Guided by tht'Se instructions, 
the jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. 
[2] Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to 
justify the conviction on the ground that it fl1ils to meet the 
requirement (embodied in the first paragraph of the instruc-
tions quoted above) that" (r]esting its case upon circum-
stantial evidence, the prosecution must not only show a set 
of circumstances consistent with guilt, but must show a set of 
circumstances inconsistent with any reasonable theory of in-
nocence." (The quotation is from opinion of Justice Prt>ston 
in People v. Lamson, 1 Cal.2d 648, 653 [36 P.2d ~61J; 
ct. People v. Perkins, 8 Cal.2d 502, 510 [66 P.2d 631J ; People 
v. Newland, 15 Ca1.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778).) This conten-
tion confuses the function of court and jury by illlplyil1g 
that if the court itself can formulate a rt'usonsble theory 
of innocence from the evidence it must reverse a judgment 
of conviction. It is not for the court, howe"er, to determine 
I 
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whether it can formulate such a theory. It must assume in favor 
of the verdict the existence of every fact that the jury could 
reasonably deduce from the evidence and then determine 
whether or not a reasonable jury could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. "If the circumstances rea-
sonably justify the verdict of the jury, the opinion of the re-
viewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be 
reconciled with the innocence of the defendant will not warrant 
interference with the determination of the jury." (People v . 
.Yewland, 15 Ca1.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778].) Thus, "the 
rnle that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution 
1l111st be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with an hy-
pot hesis of innocence is a rule of instruction for the jury, and 
is Ilot the rule for the guidance of the court on review." (Peo-
pI c \'. Newland, supra, at page 682.) 
"The functions of the jury include the determination of 
thl' credibility of witnesses, thl' weighing of the evidence. 
flllcl the drawing of justifiable inferences of fact from proven 
fa!'ts. It is the function of the judge to deny the jury any 
opportunity to operate beyond its province. The jury may 
not be permitted to conjecture merely or to conclude upon 
pnre speculation or from passion, prejudice or sympathy. 
The critical point in this boundary is the existence or non-
exilltence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt. If the evidence 
is snch that reasonable jurymen must necessarily have such 
a d01lbt, the judge must require acquittal, because no other' 
result is permissible within the fixed bounds of jury consid-
eration. But if a reasonable mind might fairly have a rea-
sonable doubt or might fairly not have one, the case is for the 
jury, and the decision is for the jurors to make. The law 
recognizes that the scope of a reasonable mind is broad. Its 
conclusion is not always a point certain, but, upon given evi-
dence, may be one of a number of conclusions. Both innocence '. 
and guilt beyond reasonable doubt may lie fairly within the 
limits of reasonable conclusion from given facts. The judge's 
function is exhausted when he determines that the evidence 
does or does not permit the conclusion of guilt beyond rea-
sonable doubt within the fair operation of a reasonable 
mind." (Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232.) 
[3] In the light of the evidence in this ease the jury could 
reasonably be convinced beyond a rl'Rsonable doubt that de-
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Wben the witness Doucet met Paulson in Sacramento on 
December 21st, 18 hours before he disappeared, Paulson 
had just acquired a lamp for his cabin and gave no indication 
that he was likely to leave Sacramento suddenly. Immedi-
ately after Paulson's disappearance the next day, defendant 
assumed ownership of Paulson's goods, much of which Paul-
son would normally have carried with him while travelling. 
The first morning after that disappearance defendant dug 
the latrine in which the decedent's bloody belongings were 
found. He encouraged others to use the latrine. 
Defendant sold Paulson's goods under a fictitious name 
and lied when questioned about it. He admitted selling the 
goods only when informed that state experts had compared 
the handwriting in the sales book of the secondhand store 
and samples of his handwriting, and had found that they 
were similar. 
Two days after Paulson disappeared, defendant was seen 
burning straw from the bunk Paulson had used. Defendant 
admitted "cleaning up around" the bunk and burning 
"reddish" paper that had been under the straw. A block 
of wood subsequently taken from the headboard of that bunk 
by the officers, and two blankets found on the bunk on Janu-
ary 21st, were stained with human blood. The rope found 
in the cabin on January 21st was the same type as that 
used to tie the ankles of Paulson's body. Wben defendant 
was asked on January 21st to tie a knot in that rope, he tied 
one similar to that used to tie the legs of the corpse. 
The blade of the small hatchet found in the cabin titted the 
wounds on Paulson's neck "almost perfectly." According to 
the testimony of the autopsy surgeon, the hammer part of 
the hatchet could have been the blunt instrument used for 
the fatal blows. 
A bottle containing the sum that defendant specified as the 
amount stolen from Paulson was found buried in the floor 
of the shack. In the same hole were newspapers dated Janu-
ary 17, 1949, three weeks after Paulson's disappearance on 
December 22, 1948. 
In the light of this cogent evidence we cannot say that a 
reasonable jury could not find defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J.t Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J.t concurred. 
